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I. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
A. FSIA BEFORE T-E SUPREME COURT"
Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA"), a foreign state is immune from
suit, and its property from execution, unless an exception applies.' In Samantar v. Yousuf,
the Supreme Court resolved the circuit split on whether FSLA governs questions of immu-
nity of foreign officials acting in their official capacities, holding that they are governed by
the common law, not the FSIA.2 Finding no reason to believe that Congress wanted to
eliminate the State Department's role in foreign official immunity determinations, the
Court declined to define "the precise scope of an official's immunity at common law" and
remanded for further proceedings.3 The Court emphasized the narrowness of its holding,
noting that not every case "can be successfully pleaded against an individual official
alone," and that the FSIA might apply if a foreign state is a required party under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure ("FRCP") 19(a)(1)(B) or if a suit is against a foreign official where
the state is the real party in interest.4
* Elaine Metlin is a Partner at Dickstein Shapiro LLP, Washington, D.C. Ekaterina Schoenefeld is the
owner of Schoenefeld Law Firm LLC, Princeton, New Jersey.
" Contributed by Jonathan I. Blackman, Partner, and Carmine D. Boccuzzi, Partner, Cleary, Gottlieb,
Steen & Hamilton LLP in New York, New York, with assistance from Ann Nee and Michael Brennan, both
associates at the same firm.
1. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604, 1609 (2011).
2. Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2285-93 (2010).
3. Id. at 2289-93. Previously, a foreign state could request a "suggestion of immunity" from the State
Department, which, if granted, led the court to surrender its jurisdiction. Id. at 2284. Otherwise, the court
had authority to decide whether immunity existed. Id.
4. Id. at 2292 n.20 (plaintiffs must establish personal jurisdiction over foreign officials without recourse to
the FSIA's service of process or jurisdiction provisions); see also In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 718
F. Supp. 2d 456, 495 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (dismissing foreign officials for lack of personal jurisdiction); Abi
Jaoudi & Azar Trading Corp. v. Cigna Worldwide Ins. Co., 391 F. App'x 173, 181 (3d Cir. 2010).
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B. EXCEPTIONS To JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNTYY
1. The Commercial Activity Exception
The commercial activity exception to jurisdictional immunity under Section 1605(a)(2)
provides that a foreign state is not immune from suit where it has engaged in one of the
enumerated categories of commercial activity.5 For example, the refusal by a state to
honor an agreement that payment could be demanded anywhere might constitute a "di-
rect effect" under the statute.6 Additionally, a state's actions preventing a U.S. corpora-
tion from entering into contractually required subcontracts with two U.S. entities causing
lost profits was a direct effect because they were guaranteed and the subcontracts had
sufficient connections to the United States.7
Conversely, a successor state's automatic succession to a prior state's liability does not
constitute sufficient "activity," but an affirmative assumption of liability, e.g., through pas-
sage of a treaty and legislation agreeing to honor the debts of the prior state.8 In Guevara
v. Peru, the Eleventh Circuit declined to find that a sovereign's failure to pay a reward
within the U.S. was a form of "negative activity" constituting a "direct effect."9
In Guirlando v. T.C. Ziraat Bankasi A.S., the Second Circuit found no "direct effect"
where a U.S. citizen caused money to be transferred out of the United States and where a
foreign sovereign's alleged negligence allowed a third party to steal that money.'0 In
Cruise Connections Charter Management 1, LP v. Attorney General of Canada, where a foreign
state's actions prevented a U.S. corporation from entering into contractually required sub-
contracts with two U.S. entities, the court found that the corporation's lost profits were a
"direct effect" under Section 1605(a)(2) because they were guaranteed, and the subcon-
tracts had sufficient connections to the United States."
2. The Expropriation Exception
In Cassirer v. Spain, the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that the expropriation excep-
tion may apply if property is "taken" by an entity other than the foreign state, that a state
art foundation's promotion in the United States of the museum and the painting at issue
constituted commercial activity, and that Section 1605(a)(3) did not mandate local exhaus-
tion of remedies.1 2
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2011). Commercial activity is different from "sovereign activity," which does
not fall under this exception. See Anglo-Tberia Underwriting Mgmt. Co. v. P.T. Jamsotek (Persero), 600 F.3d
171, 178 (2d Cir. 2010) (foreign state acting as the state's "default health insurer" is sovereign activity). See
also In re Potash Antitrust Litig., 686 F. Supp. 2d 816, 822 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (foreign state's reduction of
exports is sovereign activity).
6. DRFP L.L.C. v. Venezuela, 622 F.3d 513, 516-17 (6th Cir. 2010).
7. Cruise Connections Charter Mgmt. 1, LP v. Atty Gen. of Canada, 600 F.3d 661, 662-65 (D.C. Cir.
2010).
8. Mortimer Off Shore Servs., Ltd. v. Federal Republic of Germany, 615 F.3d 97, 106-07, 110 (2d Cit.
2010).
9. Guevara v. Peru, 608 F.3d 1297, 1310 (1lth Cir. 2010).
10. Guirlando v. T.C. Ziraat Bankasi A.S., 602 F.3d 69, 78, 81-82 (2d Cir. 2010).
11. Cruise Connections, 600 F.3d at 664-65.
12. Cassirer v. Spain, 616 F.3d 1019, 1037 (9th Cir. 2010).
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I. Service of Process Abroad***
FRCP Rule 4(f) allows service outside the United States "by any internationally agreed
means of service that is reasonably calculated to give notice, such as those authorized by
the Hague Convention."' 3 If ratified, the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of
Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents ("Hague Convention") provisions are the exclusive
means to effectuate process.14
A. SERVICE OF PROCESS BY INTERNATIONAL MAIL
Article 10(a) of the Hague Convention provides that, as long as a foreign state "does not
object, the present Convention shall not interfere with . . . send[ing] judicial documents,
by postal channels, directly to persons abroad.""s In Knit With v. Knitting Fever, Inc., a
district court applied Article 10(a), finding that service in Italy was improper because Ital-
ian law does not permit an attorney to use a private mail carrier for service of process, and
service in England was improper because the plaintiff did not comply with Rule
4(f)(2)(C)(ii), requiring a court clerk to send the documents.' 6
B. IMPROPER SERVICE
International service of process must comply with the host country's laws. In Marcus
Food Co. v. DiPanfilo, a Canadian defendant unsuccessfully challenged a default judgment
on grounds of improper service.1 7 Because Article 10(b) of the Hague Convention allows
"competent persons" to effect service if the destination state has not objected and Canada
failed to object, the court upheld service.' 8
In GAM Accessories, Inc. v. Solnicki, the plaintiff attempted service on the defendant in
Argentina with a subpoena through a local attorney.' 9 Article 19 of the Hague Conven-
tion permits any method of service specifically authorized by the host country,20 but the
plaintiff could not prove that such service was approved under Argentine law. 21
C. ALTERNATIVE SERVICE OF PROCESS
FRCP Rule 4(f)(3) permits service by other means not prohibited by international
agreement if prior court approval is obtained. In Jimena v. UBS AG Bank, the court de-
** Contributed by William Lawrence, partner at Frommer, Lawrence & Huag, LLP, New York, New
York.
13. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(0(3).
14. See Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 699 (1988).
15. The Knit With v. Knitting Fever, Inc., No. 08-4221, 08-4775, 2010 WL 2788203, at *4 (E.D. Pa. July
13, 2010).
16. Id. at *7-8.
17. Marcus Food Co. v. DiPanfilo, No. 09-1261-EFM, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107269, at *8 (D. Kan. Oct.
5, 2010).
18. Id. at *14-15.
19. GMA Accessories, Inc. v. Solnicki, No. 07 Civ. 3219, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101256, at *6 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 24, 2010).
20. Id.
21. Id. at *13.
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nied a plaintiffs motion to serve a defendant through an attorney who represented him in
another case. 22 While Rule 4(f)(3) allows court-directed service if it is not prohibited by
international (or other countries') laws and is reasonably calculated to give notice, service
on an attorney is generally inappropriate because of the adverse effect it may have on the
attorney-client relationship. 23
In Tracfone Wireless, Inc. v. Distelec Distribuciones Electronicas, SA., the court considered a
Honduran defendant's motion to dismiss for improper service of process and plaintiffs
motion for alternative service under Rule 4(0(3).24 Because Honduras is not a signatory to
the Hague Convention, the court applied Honduran law. The court granted plaintiffs
request for service by FedEx on defendant and hand delivery on defendant's U.S. attor-
neys because this method was not expressly prohibited by Honduran law. 25 In Chanel Inc.
v. Zhong Zhibing, the plaintiff sought to serve a Chinese defendant via e-mail because
defendant's address was unknown. 26 Although China is a signatory to the Hague Conven-
tion, the court approved service by e-mail because it provided the "greatest likelihood" of
reaching the defendant, which was an e-commerce business. 27
In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litigation highlights the fact-specific nature of
international service of process. One plaintiff moved to authorize service on the attorneys
for a Taiwanese defendant. 28 The defendant argued that letters rogatory must be used
because Taiwan was not a signatory to the Hague Convention. 29 The court granted the
motion because Rule 4(0(3) service is not the exclusive means of service and letters roga-
tory were expensive and time-consuming.
E. The Act of State Doctrine*
The act of state doctrine is a prudential limitation on the exercise of judicial review in
matters of foreign relations more appropriately left to other branches of government.30
U.S. courts avoid reviewing cases that require judging the validity of official acts of a
foreign state performed in its own territory.31
22. Jimena v. UBS AG Bank, No. CV-F-07-367, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57359, at *1-2 (E.D. Cal. June 10,
2010).
23. Id. at *12, *17-18.
24. Tracfone Wireless, Inc. v. Distelec Distribuciones Electronics, S.A. de DV. 268 F.R.D. 687, 688-89
(S.D. Fla. 2010).
25. Id. at 690.
26. Chanel, Inc. v. Zhong Zhibing, No. 2:09-cv-02835-cgc, 2010 WL 1009981, at *1-2 (W.D. Tenn. Mar.
17, 2010).
27. Id. at *3-4.
28. See generally In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., 270 F.R.D. 535, 536-37 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
29. Id. at 5366.
* Contributed by William Lawrence, partner at Frommer, Lawrence & Huag, LLP, New York, New
York.
30. See Siderman de Blake v. Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 707 (9th Cir. 1992).
31. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401 (1964); Credit Suisse v. U.S. Dist. Court
for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 130 F.3d 1342, 1348 (9th Cir. 1997).
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A. RELATIONSHIP TO THE FSIA
In Samantar v. Yousuf, the Supreme Court held that immunity claims of foreign govern-
ment officials are subject to common law, not FSIA.32 The Court reaffirmed that the act
of state doctrine may be invoked with respect to acts taken by an individual government
official and not only the acts of a foreign state per se.3 3
B. APPLICATION OF DocTIUiNE
In Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, the court determined that a state's knowledge that
certain funds were destined for a terrorist group's bank account was not an "act" of a
foreign state. 34 In United States v. Knowles, the Eleventh Circuit held that a U.S. court
could not judge the legality of foreign authorities' decision to extradite the defendant
because that decision was an "official act of a foreign sovereign," to which the act of state
doctrine applied.35
C. COMMERCIAL ACTivrry EXCEPTION
Unlike another circuit,36 in Animal Science Products v. China National Metals, the court
concluded that the act of state doctrine includes a "'commercial activity' exception" pre-
cluding its application to commercial, as opposed to sovereign, acts.37 The court in Mc-
Kesson v. Islamic Republic of Iran38 similarly held the doctrine inapplicable to Iran's purely
commercial acts. Regarding Iran's non-commercial acts, the court rejected the act of state
doctrine because plaintiffs expropriation claim fell under the Second Hickenlooper
Amendment. 39
D. DETERMINING WHETHER SOVEREIGN ACTs ARE IMPLICATED
In In re Potash Antitrust Litigation, the court denied a motion to dismiss under the act of
state doctrine because the record was unclear whether the court would ever be called upon
to assess the validity of state action, or whether the "alleged conduct was compelled by an
official act of the Republic of Belarus."4 0
32. Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2292.
33. Id. at 2290.
34. See Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 08-cv-1460, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111469, at *106, *109
(D.D.C. Oct. 20, 2010).
35. United States v. Knowles, 390 Fed. App'x 915, 928 (11th Cir. 2010).
36. See Honduras Aircraft Registry, Ltd. v. Honduras, 129 F.3d 543, 550 (11th Cir. 1997).
37. Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China Nat'l Metals & Minerals Import & Export Corp., 702 F. Supp. 2d
320, 420-21 (D.NJ. 2010).
38. McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 82-0220, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109368, at *17-18
(D.D.C. Nov. 20, 2009).
39. See 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (2011).
40. In re Potash Antitrust Litigation, 686 F. Supp. 2d 816, 825 (N.D. Ill. 2010).
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E. VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
In In re Refined Petroleum Products Antitrust Litigation, the district court dismissed plain-
tiffs' claim that defendant oil companies violated the Sherman Antitrust Act by allegedly
conspiring with Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Russia, and others to fix prices through limits on
their production of crude oil.41 On appeal now pending, the Fifth Circuit requested the
United States' views on whether the act of state and political question doctrines apply.
The Government strongly endorsed dismissal on both grounds.42
IV. International Discovery*
A. OBTAINING U.S. DISCOVERY FOR USE IN FOREIGN PROCEEDINGS
Several court decisions analyzed the factors set out in 28 U.S.C. §1782(a) and the Su-
preme Court in Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro determined whether to exercise discretion
and allow discovery pursuant to Section 1782(a).4 3 In Ecuadorian Plaintiffs v. Chevron
Corp., the Fifth Circuit noted that while work product protection was waived in this case,
even when discovery is permissible under Section 1782(a), a party may not seek informa-
tion protected by "privileges recognized by foreign law."44 But, when a motion is tardy
under FRCP 45, work product and attorney client privileged communications may be
discoverable. Additionally, journalist privilege can be overcome by demonstrating "likely
relevance to a significant issue in the case" and that such evidence was "not reasonably
obtainable from other available sources."45
In In re Winning (HIK) Shipping Co., the court considered whether private arbitral bodies
fall within the scope of tribunals to which Section 1782(a) applies, holding that in this case
it was applicable because the arbitral tribunal's decision would be subject to judicial review
in England pursuant to the Arbitration Act of 1996.46
Recently, some courts have demonstrated an increased willingness to apply Section
1782 where the evidence produced will be used in arbitration under a bilateral investment
treaty ("BIT").47
41. In re Refined Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 649 F. Supp. 2d 572, 576-77, 598 (S.D. Tex. 2009).
42. Spectrum Stores Inc. v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., - F.3d -, 2011 WL 386871, at *n.11 (5th Cir.
2011).
* Contributed by Howard S. Zelbo, Partner at Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton LLP in New York,
New York, with assistance from Diana C. Miller and Heide Motaghi Iravani, associates at the same firm.
43. Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 243 (2004).
44. Ecuadorian Plaintiffs v. Chevron Corp., 619 F.3d 373, 377 (5th Cir. 2010).
45. See In re Chevron Corp., 709 F. Supp. 2d 283, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
46. In re Winning (HK) Shipping Co., No. 09-22659, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54290, at *27-28 (S.D. Fla.
Apr. 30, 2010).
47. In re Chevron Corp., 709 F. Supp. 2d at 291; In re Veiga, No. 10-370, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111468,
at *33 (D.D.C. Oct. 20, 2010).
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B. OBTAINING DISCOVERY FROM ABROAD FOR USE IN U.S. PROCEEDINGS
In the case of In re Air Cargo Shipping Services Antitrust Litigation,48 Societe Air France
withheld documents based on a French blocking statute allegedly requiring plaintiffs to
seek the documents under the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in
Civil or Commercial Matters ("Hague Convention").49 Applying the balancing test set
forth in SociitiNationale Indurtrielle Airospatiale v. U.S. District Court for Southern District of
Iowa,50 the court granted the plaintiffs' request to compel production, holding that resort
to the Hague Convention would not be "effective" or "efficient" under the circum-
stances.5 The court also held that the U.S. public policy of enforcing antitrust laws out-
weighed interests of comity.52
Addressing procedural requirements for Letters of Request under the Hague Conven-
tion, the court in Pronova BioPharma Norge AS v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. rejected
Pronova's argument that Letters of Request were "inappropriate" because they sought
privileged information.s3 The court reasoned that, if that was the case, "the requests will
presumably be narrowed by the appropriate judicial authorities in those countries."5 4
V. Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Law*
In determining whether to apply U.S. law extraterritorially, courts follow the principles
articulated in the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations.55 Last year, U.S. courts applied
these principles widely, considering extraterritoriality in disputes involving securities law,
civil RICO claims, and criminal statutes.
A. SECURITIEs LAW
In Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., the Supreme Court held that, absent a clear
indication that a statute is intended to apply extraterritorially, it has no extraterritorial
reach.56 The Court considered whether §10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act pro-
vides a cause of action to foreign plaintiffs suing foreign and American defendants in con-
nection with securities traded on foreign exchanges.57 The district court had dismissed
the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.58 The Second Circuit affirmed, not-
ing that the acts performed in the United States did not constitute the "heart of the al-
48. In re Air Cargo Shipping Serys. Antitrust Litig., No. 1775, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30598, at *52-53
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2010).
49. See generally Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters,
Oct. 7, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 2555.
50. 482 U.S. 522, 546 (1987).
51. In re Air Cargo Shipping Sers. Antitrust Litig., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30598 at *57-58.
52. Id. at *60-62. See also In re Air Cargo Shipping Servs. Antitrust Litig., No. 1775, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
75974, at *41, *45 (E.D.N.Y. July 23, 2010) (compelling discovery under "alternative means" test).
53. Pronova Biopharma Norge AS v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 708 F. Supp. 2d 450, 453 (D. Del. 2010).
54. Id.
* Contributed by Karen E. Woody, attorney at Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP.
55. REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONs LAW OF U.S. § 402 (1987).
56. Morrison v. Nat'l Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2888 (2010).
57. Id. at 2875.
58. Id. at 2876.
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leged fraud."59 The Supreme Court disagreed, noting that the court had jurisdiction to
hear the case, but affirmed the dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted because there was no affirmative indication that §10(b) applied
extraterritorially. 60
B. CIVIL Rico
The Second Circuit held that the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act
("RICO") did not apply extraterritorially. 61 The district court dismissed for lack of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction because the principal events underlying the claim occurred outside
the United States.62 The Second Circuit affirmed because the statute gave no clear indi-
cation of extraterritorial application. 63
C. CuMmIAL STATUTES
In United States v. Lepa-Sanchez, defendant moved to dismiss a charge under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1959, which prohibits violent crime in aid of a racketeering enterprise, arguing that the
statute did not apply extraterritorially.64 Leija-Sanchez was accused of arranging the mur-
der of a Mexican citizen in Mexico; the assassins were also Mexican citizens. The Seventh
Circuit held that a section 1959 offense includes "multiple acts by which a crime such as
murder facilitates the criminal enterprise," reasoning that the statute applied because
Leija-Sanchez was in the United States when he planned the murder and because its pur-
pose was to reduce competition in a crime syndicate based in the United States.65
In United States v. Frank, the circuit court affirmed the defendant's conviction under 18
U.S.C. § 2251A, prohibiting the purchase of a minor with intent to engage in sexually
explicit conduct and produce any visual depiction of such conduct.66 The Eleventh Cir-
cuit held that section 2251A applied extraterritorially because the statute included lan-
guage stating that, in the course of the prohibited conduct, the defendant or minor "travel
in . .. interstate or foreign commerce."67
VI. Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards and Judgments*
In U.S. courts, the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of For-
eign Arbitral Awards 68 governs the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards
59. Id.
60. Id. at 2888.
61. Norex Petroleum Ltd. v. Access Indus., Inc., 622 F.3d 148, 152 (2d Cir. 2010).
62. Id. at 150.
63. Id. at 152.
64. United States v. Leija-Sanchez, 602 F.3d 797, 798 (7th Cir. 2010).
65. Id. at 800.
66. United States v. Frank, 599 F.3d 1221, 1229 (11th Cir. 2010).
67. Id. at 1230.
* Contributed by Neale H. Bergman, Attorney-Adviser, Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of
State. The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the
U.S. Department of State or the U.S. Government.
68. U.N. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21
U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention].
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and is implemented in U.S. law through Chapter Two of the Federal Arbitration Act
("FAA").69 The New York Convention applies to awards "made in the territory" of a State
other than the enforcing State and to awards "not considered as domestic awards" in the
enforcing State.70 State law, however, governs the recognition and enforcement of for-
eign court judgments. Many states have adopted the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments
Recognition Act, which is based upon the comity principles expressed in Hilton v. Guyot.71
Other state courts generally apply the Hilton principles as a matter of common law.
A. RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FoREIGN ARBITRAL AwARDS
In Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., the Supreme Court held that sections 10
and 11 "provide exclusive regimes for the review provided by the [FAA]."72 Subsequently,
several cases have addressed whether manifest disregard of the law remains a viable
ground for vacatur under the FAA.73 In Stolt-Nielsen S.A. et al. v. AnimalFeeds International
Corp., the Supreme Court vacated an arbitral award permitting class arbitration where the
arbitration clause was silent on that issue because the arbitral panel "imposed its own
policy choice and thus exceeded its powers."7 4 Because the parties had stipulated that
their arbitration clause was silent on class arbitration, the panel was required "to identify
the rule of law that governs in that situation." 75 The panel failed to do so, instead reach-
ing a conclusion "fundamentally at war with the foundational FAA principle that arbitra-
tion is a matter of consent." 76
In Republic of Argentina v. BG Group PLC, the court rejected Argentina's petition to
vacate or modify an approximately $185 million arbitral award issued in Washington,
D.C. 77 Argentina claimed that the court had jurisdiction because the New York Conven-
tion ("Convention") applied, while arguing the contrary with respect to a cross-motion for
a pre-judgment bond issued pursuant to article VI of that Convention. 78 Referring to
section 202 of the FAA, the court found it had jurisdiction because, given that the Con-
69. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08
(2011).
70. New York Convention, supra note 68, art. I(1). See also Inter-American Convention on International
Commercial Arbitration, June 16, 1976 (Panama Convention), available at http://www.sice.oas.org/dispute/
comarb/iacac/iacac2e.asp (governing the recognition and enforcement of awards among member States of the
Organization of American States (OAS) who are party and implemented in U.S. law through Chapter 3 of the
FAA); 9 U.S.C §§ 301-07 (2011). Unless otherwise agreed, the Panama Convention applies to the exclusion
of the New York Convention "[i]f a majority of the parties to the arbitration agreement are citizens of a State
or States that have ratified or acceded to the [Panama Convention] and are members States of the [OAS.]"
See 9 U.S.C. § 305.
71. See generally Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
72. See generally Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 590 (2008).
73. See Stolt-NielsenNielson S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1766-76 (2010); Ramos-
Santiago v. United Parcel Serv., 524 F.3d 120, 124-25 (1st Cir. 2008); Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. Bacon,
562 F.3d 349, 350 (5th Cir. 2009); Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv West Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277, 1281-83 (9th
Cit. 2009).
74. Id. at 1766-67, 1770, 1777.
75. Id. at 1768.
76. Id. at 1767-68, 1775.
77. Argentina v. BG Group PLC, 715 F. Supp. 2d 108, 114, 118, 126 (D.D.C. 2010).
78. Id. at 116-17.
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vention could cover arbitral awards involving two domestic parties under certain
circumstances:
it would be nonsensical .. . to conclude that the Award-which was issued in a dispute
involving two foreign parties, a foreign treaty, and a foreign investment-falls outside the
reach of a treaty that was ratified for the purpose of recognizing and enforcingforeign
arbitral awards. 79
Ultimately, the court rejected Argentina's arguments on the merits, refusing to vacate
or modify the award.80
B. RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREiGN COURT JUDGMENTS
In Servaas Incorporated v. Republic oflraq, the court denied defendants' motion to dismiss
for lack of personal and subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim in a
recognition proceeding of a judgment issued by the Paris Commercial Court against the
Iraqi Ministry of Industry.8 Applying the "commercial activities" exception of the FSIA,
the court found that it had jurisdiction over both Iraq and its "alter ego," the Ministry of
Industry.82 The court then noted that article 53 of New York's Uniform Foreign Country
Money-Judgments Recognition Act applies to "any foreign country judgment which is
final, conclusive and enforceable where rendered even [if] an appeal ... is pending or it is
subject to appeal."83 Noting that the French judgment was both final and enforceable, the
court stated that a foreign country judgment:
is considered "conclusive between the parties to the extent that it grants or denies
recovery of a sum of money" . . . unless (1) "the judgment was rendered under a
system which does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the
requirements of due process of law;" or (2) "the foreign court did not have personal
jurisdiction over the defendant."84
Finding that neither exception applied, the court held that the plaintiff stated a claim
under article 53.85 On enforceability, the court rejected Iraq's argument that its assets in
the United States were immune because Executive Order 13,364 only bars "judgments
with respect to certain delineated Iraqi assets in the United States."8 6
In Continental Transfirt Technique Ltd. v. Federal Government ofNigeria, the court denied
Nigeria's motions to dismiss actions to enforce a $252 million arbitral award issued in the
United Kingdom under Nigerian law and an English court order enforcing that award.87
The court denied Nigeria's motion to dismiss with respect to enforcement of the arbitral
award under the FAA and New York Convention.88 The court also rejected Nigeria's
79. Id. at 119-20.
80. Id. at 120-25.
81. Servaas Inc. v. Republic of Iraq, 686 F. Supp. 2d 346, 348-50 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
82. Id. at 354-58.
83. Id. at 359 (quoting N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5302 (McKDNEY 2005)).
84. Id. (quoting N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5303-04 (McKnNEY 2005)) (citation omitted).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 359-60.
87, Cont'l Transfert Technique Ltd. v. Nigeria, 697 F. Supp. 2d 46, 52, 65 (D.D.C. 2010).
88. See id. at 55-58, 61-62.
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motion with respect to enforcement of the English court's order under the Uniform For-
eign Money-Judgments Recognition Act ("D.C. Money-Judgments Recognition Act").89
Finding that the English court order was a judgment as defined by the statute,90 the court
rejected Nigeria's claim that the English court order was "obtained by fraud" because only
extrinsic fraud constitutes a ground for non-enforcement. 91 Finally, the court rejected
Nigeria's argument that enforcement should be dismissed or stayed because it was seeking
to set aside the English court order.92 The D.C. Money-Judgments Recognition Act does
not authorize dismissal of proceedings if an appeal is pending, or the defendant is entitled
to appeal, and Nigeria was not entitled to a stay in part because it failed to demonstrate
that any "attack" on that order was "likely to be successful." 93
VII. Forum Non Conveniens*
A court held that "under the common law doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court with
proper jurisdiction and venue over a matter may refrain from hearing the case if another
significantly more appropriate forum exists." 94 The party seeking dismissal for forum non
conveniens must show that: (1) "an adequate alternative forum exists; and (2) . . . the
balance of private and public interest factors favors dismissal."95
A. ADEQUACY OF REMEDIES IN THE ALTERNATE FORUM
An alternative forum is "adequate" if the "remedy provided by the alternative forum is
[not] so clearly inadequate or unsatisfactory that it is no remedy at all." 96 The remedy
need not be judicial. In Steward International Enhanced Index Fund v. Carr, shareholders
sued the directors of Cadbury, a U.K. corporation, in connection with its acquisition by
Kraft Foods.97 Plaintiffs argued that the proceedings were administrative and did not
offer the opportunity to litigate.98 The court disagreed, stating that "the proper inquiry
should be premised upon the fairness of the procedures and potential remedies that the
forum can provide."99
In Tang v. Synutra International, Chinese citizens sued a U.S. corporation in Maryland
in the wake of the milk contamination crisis in China. 00 The Chinese government had
organized a compensation fund independent of the Chinese judicial system, which refused
89. See id. at 54-55, 62, 65.
90. Id. at 62-63.
91. Id. at 62-64.
92. Id. at 65.
93. Id.
* Contributed by Phillip B. Dye, Jr. and Russell T. Gips of Vinson & Elkins LLP in Houston, Texas.
94. Trabucco v. Intesa Sanpaolo, S.P.A., 695 F. Supp. 2d 98, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
95. Cook v. Champion Shipping AS, No. 2:09-CV-03605, 2010 WL 3069346, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 4,
2010). The relevant private and public interest factors to be balanced are set forth in Gulf Oil Corp. v.
Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947).
96. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254 (1981).
97. Steward Int'l Enhanced Index Fund v. Carr, No. 09-CV-5006, 2010 WL 336276, at *1, *3 (D.NJ. Jan.
22, 2010).
98. Id. at *4.
99. Id. at *5.
100. Tang v, Synutra Int'l, Inc., No. 09-0088, 2010 WL 1375373, at *1 (D. Md. Mar. 29, 2010).
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to address the victims' claims.101 The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the Chi-
nese courts' inaction rendered them unavailable, observing that "another remedy is undis-
putedly available, namely, the compensation program." 0 2
B. RE-LITIGATING FORUM NON CONVENIENS
In Can v. Goodrich Pump & Engine Control Systems, Incorporated, Turkish citizens filed suit
in federal court in Connecticut, asserting claims against U.S. manufacturers stemming
from a helicopter crash in Turkey.o3 An Indiana state court had previously dismissed an
almost identical suit on forum non conveniens grounds. The court held that collateral
estoppel prohibited the plaintiffs from filing again in the United States, reasoning that the
issue "was not whether the action should be tried in Indiana or Connecticut . . . but
whether the action should be tried in the United States or Turkey." 04
In contrast, in Meifer v. Qwest Communications, a federal court in Colorado found that a
previous forum non conveniens dismissal did not preclude the plaintiffs from refiling in
Colorado. 05 The New Jersey district court and Third Circuit decisions "analyzed most
of the relevant factors by comparing the United States generally and the Netherlands"
instead of New Jersey and the Netherlands.10 6 Thus, the Third Circuit stated that this
decision did "not necessarily mean that this action may not be maintainable in another
federal district." 0 7 The Colorado court therefore conducted its own analysis from a Col-
orado perspective and eventually dismissed the claims based on forum non conveniens.
C. PRIVATE INTEREST FACTORS
In weighing the private interest factors, courts consider ease of access to proof in the
competing fora. In Rodriguez v. Samsung Electronics Company, the court noted it could not
"evaluate the importance of [the] potential witnesses' testimony" where the defendant had
merely listed the witnesses' names. 08 In contrast, in Marnavi Splendor GMBH & Co. KG
v. Alston Power Conversion, Incorporated, the defendants provided a descriptive list of poten-
tial witnesses and the court found that the location of the defendants' witnesses weighed in
favor of their choice of forum.109
101. Id.
102. Id. at *9-10.
103. Can v. Goodrich Pump & Engine Control Sys., Inc., 711 F. Supp. 2d 241, 245 (D. Conn. 2010).
104. Id. at 251.
105. Meijer v. Qwest Commc'ns Int'l, Inc., No. 09-cv-00162-REB-KLM, 2010 WL 1348668, at *3 (D.
Colo. Mar. 31, 2010).
106. Id.
107. Id. (quoting Windt v. Qwest Commc'ns Int'l, Inc., 529 F.3d 183, 192 (3d Cir. 2008)).
108. Rodriguez v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., No. 09-11028-NMG, 2010 WL 3238839, at *5 (D. Mass. Aug.
16, 2010); see also Rogers v. Petr6leo Brasileiro, S.A., Nos. 09 Civ. 08227 (PGG), 09 Civ. 08228 (PGG), 2010
WL 3768158, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2010) (denying motion and observing that no specific witnesses in
Brazil were identified).
109. Marnavi Splendor GMBH & Co. KG v. Alston Power Conversion, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 2d 749, 757-58
(S.D. Tex. 2010).
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VIII. Parallel Proceedings*
Parallel proceedings exist where "substantially the same parties are litigating substan-
tially the same issues simultaneously in two fora."Ino U.S. courts confronted with motions
to stay or dismiss parallel proceedings and motions for anti-suit injunctions invoke princi-
ples of international comity and abstention to resolve them.
A. THE COLORADo RIVER ABSTENTION DocrRnTH
In cases involving foreign proceedings, most courts have extended the factors set out in
Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States to determine whether to abstain
from hearing a case in favor of a pending foreign suit.n11 These factors include the relative
inconvenience of the two fora, "the need to avoid piecemeal litigation," the order in which
the proceedings were filed, and whether domestic or foreign law provides the rule of deci-
sion. 112 Additionally, the court must determine whether "exceptional circumstances" jus-
tify surrender of jurisdiction.11 3
In Kitaru Innovations Inc. v. Chandaria, a Barbados company sued a British patent holder,
seeking a declaratory judgment that it had not infringed a patent. 114 The defendants
moved to dismiss based on parallel proceedings in the Superior Court of Justice for Onta-
rio, Canada. Although both cases involved the same parties and similar issues, the district
court denied the motion to dismiss because the first-filed Canadian action had not
"progressed significantly since that filing."'15 The court also rejected the defendants' ar-
gument that having to litigate in two fora, where the locus of core facts was in Canada,
constituted "exceptional circumstances" justifying abstention.116
In Farhang v. Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpurr, the court held that the Colorado
River factors need not be considered if there is substantial doubt as to whether the foreign
proceeding will resolve the federal action.'17 One defendant moved to stay the federal
case pending resolution of proceedings in the High Court at Calcutta, India, under the
international abstention doctrine.'"' The court denied the motion in part because of
doubt that the Indian proceedings would resolve all the issues in the case.
* Contributed by Lorraine de Germiny, Associate, King & Spalding LLP.
110. Groeneveld Transp. Efficiency, Inc. v. Lubecore Int'l, Inc., No. 1:10 CV 702, 2010 WL 2991504, at *3
(N.D. OhioJuly 28, 2010) (quoting Finova Capital Corp. v. Ryan Helicopters U.S.A., 180 F.3d 896, 898 (7th
Cir. 1999)).
111. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 801 (1976).
112. Groeneveld Transp. Efficiency, Inc., 2010 WL 2991504 at *3; Brake Parts, Inc. v. Lewis, Nos. 09-132-
KSF, 10-212-KSF, 2010 WL 3470198, at *3-4 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 31, 2010); Farhang v. Indian Inst. of Tech.,
Kharagpur, No. C-08-02658 RMW, 2010 WL 2228936, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 1, 2010).
113. Kitaru Innovations Inc. v. Chandaria, 698 F. Supp. 2d 386, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting Royal & Sun
Alliance Ins. Co. of Can. v. Century Int'l Arms, Inc., 466 F.3d 88, 93 (2d Cir. 2006)).
114. Id. at 386.
115. Id. at 391.
116. Id. See also Brake Parts, Inc., 2010 WL 3470198 at *5.
117. Farbang, 2010 WL 2228936 at *2-3.
118. Id. at *1.
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B. PARALLEL PROCEEDINGS AND INTERNATIONAL COMrrY
International comity is "the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to
the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to in-
ternational duty and convenience and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons
who are under the protection of its laws."' 9 In ITL International, Inc. v. Walton & Post,
Inc., the court dismissed the case on grounds of international comity, fairness, and effi-
ciency, noting that in the Eleventh Circuit these three factors determine whether a court
should abstain from exercising jurisdiction.120 The court relied on the fact that the Do-
minican Republic proceedings had been litigated for several years and that the Dominican
courts had already rendered a final judgment. 121
In Farhang, the defendant based its motion to stay pending resolution of the Indian
legal proceedings on grounds of international comity.122 The court noted that principles
of international comity apply when there is a "true conflict between domestic and foreign
law" and that a possible inconsistency between future judgments of a domestic court and a
foreign court is not a "true conflict."l 23 Because the Indian court had not yet rendered
factual findings, there was no conflict; the court denied the motion. 124
Dedon GMBH v. Janus et Cie. involved a motion to stay proceedings on the issue of
arbitrability in favor of an ICC arbitration in London.125 Raising the question of interna-
tional comity and noting that "neither party ha[d] seriously briefed the issue,"I 26 the court
stated that it had an "undoubted responsibility" to rule on the question of arbitrability and
denied the motion to stay.127
C. PARALLEL PROCEEDINGS AND ATI-Serr INJUNCTIONs
A court may issue an anti-suit injunction barring parties from participating in foreign
litigation only if the parties are the same in both proceedings and resolution of the domes-
tic case is dispositive of the foreign action. 128 In SEC v. Pension Fund of America, the
Eleventh Circuit held that the anti-suit injunction was invalid because neither condition
was met.129
Even when both conditions are met, courts will apply one of two standards to determine
whether to issue an anti-suit injunction. Under the conservative approach, the movant
119. ITL Int'l, Inc. v. Walton & Post, Inc., No. 10-22096-CV, 2010 WL 3853272, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 29,
2010) (citations omitted).
120. Id. at *3-4.
121. Id.
122. Farhang, 2010 WL 2228936 at *1.
123. Id. (citations omitted).
124. Id.
125. Dedon GMBH v. Janus et Cie, No. 10 Civ. 04541 (CM), 2010 WL 4227309, at *8-9 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
19, 2010).
126. Id. at *10.
127. Id.
128. SEC v. Pension Fund ofAm., L.C., No. 10-10464, 2010 WL 3582429, at *3 (11th Cir. Sept. 15, 2010)
(quoting Canon Latin Am., Inc. v. Lantech (CR), S.A., 508 F.3d 597, 601 (11th Cir. 2007)); Abbott Labs. v.
Qiagen Gaithersburg, Inc., No. 10 CV 712, 2010 WL 1539952, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 15, 2010).
129. Pension Fund ofAm., L.C., 2010 WL 3582429 at *4; Abbott Labs., 2010 WL 1539952 at *4-5. See also
Int'1Litigation, 44 Irrr'L LAW. 167, 211 (2010).
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must demonstrate (1) that the foreign action would prevent U.S. jurisdiction or threaten a
vital U.S. policy, and (2) that the domestic interests outweigh international comity con-
cerns.130 Under the liberal approach, courts will enjoin foreign litigation if it will (1)
frustrate a policy of the enjoining forum, (2) be "vexatious or oppressive," (3) threaten the
domestic court's in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction, or (4) "prejudice other equitable con-
siderations."n3 1 If any of these factors is present and if "the impact on comity is tolerable,"
the court may grant an anti-suit injunction.132
130. Cont'1 Cas. Co. v. Axa Global Risks (UK) Ltd., No. 4:09-CV-00335-FJG, 2010 WL 1268038, at *3
(W.D. Mo. Apr. 2, 2010).
131. Teck Metals Ltd. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, No. CV-05-411-LRS, 2009 WL
4716037, at *3 (E.D. Wash. Dec. 8, 2009).
132. Id.
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